You should not decide this case upon the basis of sympathy for anyone, nor upon the basis of anger at anyone. As noted, plaintiff in Stanback never alleged that she had suffered any physical injury, yet we held that she had stated a claim for intentional infliction of mental distress. Plaintiff did present evidence and briefs on the question before Judge Braswell. On 7 September and 15 November 1978 defendants filed, respectively, motions for summary judgment. Unless it could be excused by reason of her having acted under duress in a prosecution against her, it could not be excused as a defense in a prosecution against defendant for the same conspiracy. Second, whether plaintiff's claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to assault and battery.
The facts brought out at the hearing on summary judgment may be briefly summarized: For a time preceding the incidents in question plaintiff Dickens, a thirty-one year old man, shared sex, alcohol and marijuana with defendants' daughter, a seventeen year old high school student. Defendants' motions for summary judgment were allowed on the ground that plaintiff's claim was for assault and battery; therefore it was barred by the one-year statute of limitations applicable to assault and battery. P sued D alleging severe and permanent mental and emotional distress. We further hold that summary judgment was, nevertheless, appropriately entered as to the femme defendant inasmuch as plaintiff has made no showing sufficient to indicate he will be able to prove a claim against her. We think the general principles of the law of torts support a right of action for physical injuries resulting from negligence, whether wilful or otherwise, none the less strongly because the physical injury consists of a wrecked nervous system instead of lacerated limbs. The case at hand involves such a situation. Plaintiff argues his complaint seeks recovery for the intentional infliction of mental distress.
They were concerned with permitting recovery for injury, physical and mental, intentionally or negligently inflicted. This tort imports an act which is done with the intention of causing emotional distress or with reckless indifference to the likelihood that emotional distress may result. We are now satisfied that the dictum in Stanback arose from our effort to conform the opinion to language in some of our earlier cases the holdings of which led ultimately to our recognition in Stanback of the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress. The motions made no reference to the statute of limitations nor did they contest plaintiff's factual allegations. The opinion, however, relied on § 436 of the Restatement. Stated another way, the question is whether the evidentiary showing demonstrates as a matter of law that plaintiff's only claim, if any, is for assault and battery. The Court said further, 210 N.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 1191-1193 1969. Defendants contend, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that this is an action grounded in assault and battery. Recovery may be had for the emotional distress so caused and for any other bodily harm which proximately results from the distress itself. Fear long continued wears away one's reserve. In the present case, as earlier discussed, the one-year statute of limitations serves to bar plaintiff's claim for assault and battery. The threat, of course, cannot be considered separately from the entire episode of which it was only a part.
Daniel, , 1904 ; State v. The common law action for civil conspiracy is for damages caused by acts committed pursuant to a conspiracy rather than for the conspiracy, i. The threats of castration and death, being threats which created apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive contact, were assaults. Byrd, we are satisfied that the dictum in Stanback was not necessary to the holding and in some respects actually conflicts with the holding. Plaintiff has alleged that defendant intentionally inflicted mental distress.
On April 2, 1975 the Defendants conspired with each other and with other persons, whose identity is unknown to the Plaintiff, to lure the plaintiff, by false and deceitful statements, to a place on and near North Carolina Highway 42 in Johnston County, North Carolina, where Plaintiff would be alone in an isolated place and unable to summons help, and there to inflict upon him severe emotional distress. The claim against Earl Puryear is remanded to that court with instructions that it be remanded to Wake Superior Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It was filed more than one year but less than three years after the incidents complained of occurred. Plaintiff alleges that Ann Puryear conspired with Earl Puryear to commit the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress upon plaintiff, and submits that there is evidence of conspiracy sufficient to withstand her motion for summary judgment. This administration ceases at time of majority or emancipation. Although plaintiff pleads the tort of intentional infliction of mental distress, the Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint's factual allegations and the factual showing at the hearing on summary judgment support only a claim for assault and battery. Although plaintiff's recovery for injury, mental or physical, directly caused by the assaults and batteries is barred by the statute of limitations, these assaults and batteries may be considered in determining the outrageous character of the ultimate threat and the extent of plaintiff's mental or emotional distress caused by it.
On 7 September and 15 November 1978 defendants filed, respectively, motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is, furthermore, a device by which a defending party may force the claimant to produce a forecast of claimant's evidence demonstrating that claimant will, at trial, be able to make out at least a prima facie case or that he will be able to surmount an affirmative defense. Plaintiff has alleged that defendant intentionally inflicted mental distress. For the reasons stated, defendant's assignments of error Nos. We further hold that summary judgment was, nevertheless, appropriately entered as to the femme defendant inasmuch as plaintiff has made no showing sufficient to indicate he will be able to prove a claim against her. Stanback, in effect, was the first formal recognition by this Court of the relatively recent tort of intentional infliction of mental distress. This demonstrates plaintiff's awareness that the statute of limitations was going to be an issue.
See Appeal of Blue Bird Taxi Co. You wouldn't pay when you could. B We now turn to some principles governing the entry of summary judgment. The three-year statute of limitations and not the one-year statute of limitations for assault and battery should be applied. It does not include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others. Moreover, he claimed that his complaint was filed more than one year from the time the tort was allegedly committed against him by defendants but within three years of that time. The evidentiary showing on the summary judgment motion does, however, indicate that defendant Earl Puryear threatened plaintiff with death in the future unless plaintiff went home, pulled his telephone off the wall, packed his clothes, and left the state.